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The Rate of Population Change as a Variable in 
Development Planning 
Through most of human history, concern for the rate of 
population change has rested on simple if harsh conditions. 
Chronic high levels of mortality could suddenly become acute 
in times of plague, famine, and war. High fertility was 
essential to the survival of the group. Population increase, 
then, became a signal of at least a temporary victory over 
death. High fertility was prescribed; barrenness was a 
curse. Still, however much prized, increases came very 
slowly indeed. At the time of Christ, humanity numbered 
about one-quarter billion. By the mid-Seventeenth century, 
it had risen to only about half a billion. 
Then, sometime around the middle of the next century, 
these conditions began to fundamentally alter in one corner 
of the earth. Starting in North-Eastern Europe, mortality 
began gradually but steadily to decline. For example, in 
Sweden, crude death rates of about 28 per thousand were 
typical for the period 1750 to 1800. By 1850 they had fallen 
to 20 and by 1900 to 16. The Swedish crude death rate 
declined to below 10 for the first time at the middle of the 
present century. The slow gains in longevity were closely 
tied to technological and economic development. 
The crude birth rate in Europe remained unchanged in 
most countries for over a century after mortality began to 
fall. Typical rates in North-Western Europe were in the 
vicinity of 35 and were higher in other regions. Early 
declines were observed in Prance and the United States. In 
general, though, a sustained downward movement in fertility 
did not appear until well into the latter half of the 
Nineteenth Century, when the processes of urbanization and 
industrialization were considerably advanced. While urbani-
zation and industrialization were unquestionably the primary 
determinants of the fall in fertility, the exact causal 
relationships remain very unclear. 
In the course of the century and a half during which 
mortality declined and fertility remained high, the popula-
tion of Europeans on the Earth increased by some 600 to 800 
per cent. A large part of this growth was absorbed in emigra-
tion from Europe. In particular, large numbers moved into 
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the thinly populated areas of che New World, Oceania, and 
Russian Asia. 
The expansion of European population began to draw to 
' a close in the period between the two World Wars. By 1930, 
concern about population decline became widespread and many 
ingenious theories were developed to explain the impending 
extinction of the Europeans. In the totalitarian nations, 
active government campaigns were mounted to press for higher 
fertility. 
After World War II, fertility rose for a time, then 
fell back. Mortality continued very slowly to decline and 
the population is increasing at less than 1 per cent per 
year. By this time, Japan has become demographically 
comparable to Europe with low birth and death rates. (In 
one group of countries- — the English-speaking countries 
outside Europe and the USSR — the postwar rise in fertility 
was of longer duration. However, it seems quite clear now 
that the "baby boom" in these countries has also come to 
an end. In the US, the birth rate has been falling steadily 
since the late '50's; in Australia there has been a recent 
sharp drop in fertility.) 
This, in brief and rather crude terms, was the "vital 
revolution" — the transition, from consistently high levels 
of fertility and mortality to low levels of both. This 
process of an early starting gradual fall in mortality 
followed by a later, more rapid decline in fertility was 
the demographic component of the course of development in 
the presently industrialized world. It is, finally, the 
experience which is sometimes thought to provide the model 
for the demographic transition in the currently developing 
nations. 
It is necessary to consider the relevance of this 
experience for the nations now planning for development. 
Clearly, some such transition must eventually take place. 
High levels of mortality are -unnecessary and intolerable in 
the modern world. But low :levels of mortality with high 
fertility implies a rate of growth which the earth's 
resources cannot sustain indefinitely. Humanity cannot 
continue forever to double every thirty-odd years. 
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Nor can the developing nations, now growing in population 
considerably more rapidly than the world average, continue 
their pace forever. A slowing down of the rate of growth 
such as occurred in Europe, Japan, and the US must even-
tually take place. 
The developing nations today face conditions quite 
different from those experienced in Europe. First, inter-
national migration has ceased to have anything more than a 
marginal importance. The filling up of the earth which 
has taken place during the last century leaves few areas 
that can absorb any substantial numbers of migrants. There 
are simply no areas large enough and having adequate 
resources to make a meaningful contribution to the problem 
of providing living space for any migrant stream of the size 
that would make a difference in the modern world. In addi-
tion, the development of the nation-state system tends to 
make boundaries increasingly impervious to population move-
ment. This is increasingly true even.in Africa where 
boundaries have traditionally been "unusually open to migrants. 
Independence has generally meant the accession to power of 
groups more responsive to domestic demands for the limita-
tion of competition for jobs that might arise if migrants 
were freely admitted. 
Secondly, reductions in mortality come ever more 
quickly, easily, and cheaply. Whereas in the European 
experience, the death rate fell at a pace closely tied to 
economic development, in the developing nations very large 
drops can be obtained almost independently of industrial 
or urban growth. The classic example of such a fall can be 
found in the case of Ceylon, where widespread use of DDT led 
to virtual elimination of malaria as a cause of death in a 
matter of months. The crude death rate of Ceylon averaged 
over 20 per thousand through 1946. (In fact, in only one 
single year, 1942 when it was 18.6, had the death rate ever 
fallen below 20). In 1947, the rate went to 14.3 and it 
has subsequently fallen below 10. Similar declines, which 
clearly cannot be explained simply in terms of economic 
development, have been observed in many other countries in 
the post war world. 
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A third difference is found in the conditions associated 
with fertility. It was mentioned earlier that the pre-modern 
birth rate in North Western Europe tended to be in the mid-
30 's. However, in general, birth rates in Africa, Asia, and 
South America currently stand considerably above that figure. 
It is not at all uncommon to find rates of 45 to 50 and in 
some instance (for example, in parts of West Africa) above 
50. Furthermore, some of the social patterns which determine 
levels of fertility and which are not easily alterable, are 
more conducive to sustained high fertility. Specifically, 
very early ages- at marriage and extended family systems are 
common.- These contrast with a distinctively late age at 
marriage and an emerging nuclear family pattern in Europe. 
In addition, the state of medical science is much advanced. 
It is possible to reduce the levels of maternal mortality 
and conditions leading to sterility far below those obtain-
ing in Europe until relatively recently. On the other hand, 
contraceptive techniques are also more fully developed and 
abortions may now be induced with only negligeable risk to 
maternal health when proper medical supervision is available. 
Another important difference is that the social and 
economic implications of population growth dynamics are 
increasingly better understood. Careful analysis points to 
the conclusion that sheer numbers are of less significance 
than the rate of change by which the numbers are reached. 
(This conclusion has added weight in the face of the 
potentialities for automation of production — but it is 
valid no matter what the state of technology.) In particular, 
it is the importance of the proportional age distribution and 
its determinants for economic and social development that 
has come to the-foreground. 
The age distribution of a human population is almost 
entirely determined by the pattern and level of fertility," 
changes in mortality have a remarkably slight effect on the 
proportions at different ages. Populations with high levels 
of fertility such as found in many of the developing (and, 
of course, the static underdeveloped) societies can expect 
to have just less than 50 per cent under age 15. And as 
long as high fertility remains, there is a distinctly un-
favorable ratio of persons in the productive working ages to 
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dependents. On the other hand, falling fertility is the 
means by which the worker-dependent ratio can be made more 
advantage ous. 
In addition, and quite apart from the effects on the 
age distribution as such, a high rate of growth has serious 
implications for development. A given percentage increase 
in population appears to require some 3 to 4 times that 
increase in capital investment merely to maintain a given 
level of equipment per capita. This is no small matter in 
a capital-poor developing economy. Further, the large 
proportion of children severely restricts the nature of the 
capital investment. Finally, high fertility sharply limits 
female participation in the labor force. 
To summarize the discussion thus far, the experience 
of the vital revolution in the industrialized societies has 
limited significance for the developing nations. The 
conditions they face are in very many ways substantially 
different from those met in the past. There is increasing 
agreement with the conclusion that demographic factors cannot 
prudently be left to chance or the future. Reasoned responses 
to the new demographic conditions are called for. The 
remainder of this paper is a review of the responses being 
worked out in the developing nations as part of their planning 
efforts. 
Attempts to reduce mortality are almost -universally 
being pressed, as indeed they must. The clear and -unambiguous 
goal is to bring mortality (and, of course, morbidity) down 
to the levels that the state of the most advanced medical 
technology will permit. Widespread falling death rates 
indicate that the efforts are bearing fruit. 
International migration has not generally been an 
important component of planning. In a few cases, such as 
Puerto Rico, emigration has been an important factor but the 
numbers are small and the circumstances quite unique. Inter-
nal migration is of greater significance but it is commonly 
recognized that it is not related to the conditions of 
population growth as such. In nations with, available land, 
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resettlement has been used to increase production and relieve 
local population pressures. However, in many other nations, 
internal migration policy has consisted of little more than 
an attempt to limit the flood of rural to urban movers. 
Most commonly, where there is any demographic concern 
at all, attention has been focussed on attempts to bring 
fertility behavior within the ambit of the planning process. 
It is worth noting, in passing, that these attempts 
have received support from a rather unexpected source. 
Attitude surveys in underdeveloped countries have shown that 
"substantial proportions both-of men and women say they want 
to limit family size, particularly after 3 or 4 children." 
Further evidence of such a desire is found in indications 
in a variety of countries (e.g., Chile, Greece, USSR) that 
the frequency of induced (and illegal)abortion is very much 
higher than previously suspected. It appears that in the 
absence of less extreme methods, abortion is being surpris-
ingly widely used in the modern world. In other words, the 
evidence is that the. assumption is quite false that whenever 
people do not plan their families in the manner of those in 
the industrialized societies, they therefore want an un-
limited number of children. 
Turning, then, to a survey of existing attempts to 
confront the demographic conditions of the developing nations, 
four topics of relevance to fertility planning will be 
considered: Policy, medical technology, field programs,and costs,, 
Policy. 
Legitimate childbearing takes- place in -almost 
all societies only within the family. The family is the 
social unit primarily charged with making decisions about 
child-bearing and child-rearing. However, other institutions 
assert strong influences over the kind of decisions made 
by families about their fertility behavior. In particular, 
religious and political organizations most commonly hold 
clearly defined positions with regard to the appropriateness 
of fertility planning. 
Family planning has been accepted as legitimate by 
nearly all Protestant Christian groups. Decisions in this 
area are left to individual conscience. Indeed, for some 
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important groups there is virtually an injunction to engage 
in responsible planning. 
The Roman Catholic Church is presently engaged, in a 
widely discussed re-appraisal of its position. There is, 
of course, no way of knowing what decision will eventually 
be taken. However, it should be noted that the stand taken 
by the Roman Catholic Church even before the present re-
appraisal did not object to family planning as such. It 
simply restricted the methods that could be used. (Unfortuna-
tely, the acceptable methods are relatively unreliable 
under the best of circumstances.) It is currently being 
argued in some important Catholic circles that it is implicit 
in the Church's recognition of the need for a re-evaluation 
that the choice of means is now a matter of individual con-
science. 
The lack of an established hierarchy makes it rather 
more difficult to easily describe the position of Islam 
on family planning. In general, though, there appears to 
be no objection on religious grounds. Further, careful 
study by Moslem scholars and theologians has led them to the 
conclusion that the responsible use of family planning is ^ entirely 
consistent with Islam and quite desirable in many situations. 
Of course, this does not mean that such a position will be 
held by every individual mullah everywhere in the Moslem 
world. However, this is the conclusion reached by the best 
informed and most thoughtful analysis. It will be shown 
below that some of the most intensive national family plan-
ning programs are to be found among the nations of the Moslem 
world. 
Similarly, there appears to be no objection to family 
planning in the Hindu and Buddhist worlds. Such negative 
reactions as are found seem to be more a matter of tradi-
tionalism than of theology. In these areas, again, it will 
be shown that strong national programs of fertility control 
are under way. 
Turning now to evaluations of fertility planning from 
a political point of view, we may begin with the Socialist 
nations. Policy on family planning is not uniform through-
out the Socialist world and has been changing in recent years. 
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However, some definite patterns emerge• in the USSR, the 
traditional antipathy toward contraception, stemming from 
( 2 ) the writings of Marx, remains rather more strongly in force.v y
Although the argument has frequently been pressed, particularly 
in medical and public health circles, that the government 
should encourage wider use of contraceptives, their importation 
and use appears still to be somewhat limited. On the other 
hand, legal regulation of abortion has been considerably 
relaxed and it is estimated that the abortion rate in the 
USSR may be one of the highest in the world. Evidence suggests 
that the rate of illegal abortions is quite high. 
It appears that there is less aversion to contraception 
in the Socialist countries of Eastern Europe, despite the 
fact that they have both a strong Roman Catholic and a Marxist 
tradition. In these countries, though, abortion is again the 
primary means of fertility control. Legal barriers to abor-
tion are less stringent here than in any other place in the 
world. The result is seen in the figures for Hungary, for 
example, where in recent years there have been more legal 
abortions registered than live births. Comparable conditions 
obtain in Poland and Czechoslovakia. 
In China, technologically the least developed of the 
major Socialist nations, policy on family planning has under-
gone several reversals in recent years. It seems now to .have 
settled down to a position quite favorable to planning. 
Delayed marriage is given very strong governmental backing. 
Sterilization and abortion are available. Contraceptives 
are imported duty-free and publications advocating birth 
control are advertised in government newspapers. All methods 
of contraception are acceptable. Premier Chou En-lai has 
stated his approval of family planning and the aspirations of 
his government to lower the rate of growth of the Chinese 
population. (In fact, he made such a statement during his 
1964 visit to Africa. Interestingly enough, he reported 
his approval of family planning in an interview in Guinea — 
a country with one of the highest birth rates in the world.) 
In the countries of Chinese culture outside China itself, 
strong national programs of family are being pressed. The 
cases of South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Thailand will be 
discussed below. 
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Resistance to family planning seems stronger in Latin 
America than in areas hitherto discussed. Even here,though, 
there is evidence of a trend toward greater acceptance. The 
revelation of extremely high rates of illegal abortions has 
softened some of the opposition to contraception. It would 
appear that the latter methods may win acceptance as the lesser 
evil. In one country, Chile, a family planning program is 
in operation and in another, Honduras, a national program is 
to be inaugurated. In some other countries government assis-
tance is given to private clinics. 
In Africa, like in Latin America, support for family 
planning is still generally not very much developed. Again, 
there are clear indications of change. This is least apparent 
in the countries associated with French influence. There 
generally are laws restricting the import, sale, and manufacture 
of contraceptives. In many of these countries, there is 
concern for what is perceived to be underpopulation. Extremes 
of population policy in Africa can be found, on the one hand, 
in Somalia, where the practice of contraception is not legal 
and, on the other, in South Africa, where the government 
appears recently to have embarked on the encouragement of a 
somewhat ludicrous pro-natalist program for the white minority. 
In the areas associated with British influence, no 
restrictions have ever been imposed of the importation and • 
use of contraceptives. Private family planning clinics are 
expanding in number and coverage. In some countries 
(Bechuanaland, Kenya, Nigeria) the centers receive financial 
support from government. However, there is nowhere in Africa 
South of the Sahara a government sponsored program of family 
planning. Indeed, in three countries, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, 
and Zambia, there is an official desire for a higher level of 
fertility. This is countered by an officially stated desire 
for a lower birthrate in Nigeria. There is some indication 
that Kenya may also be preparing to move in this direction.(3) 
To summarize the discussion of policy, it appears fair 
to say that recent years have seen a decline in ideological 
resistance to family planning. In only a few societies or 
regions is there outright condemnation; more and more 
populations are accepting the necessity and desirability, of 
planning. 
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However, a favorable policy disposition toward family 
planning does not necessarily imply that such planning will 
in fact take place. Government or religious policy may 
not even be a necessary condition! it surely is not a 
sufficient one for family planning. An essential component 
to planning is the technical means and to that subject we 
now turn. 
Medical technology. 
Attempts at contraception are probably almost as old 
as prescriptions to bear many children. The Talmud contains 
information on useful contraceptives. Similar discussions, 
along with a good deal of superstition and misinformation, 
are found in medieval treatises from the Oriental, Moslems, 
and Christian worlds. More or less effective contraceptive 
methods are known to human groups quite apart from their 
level of technological development. In East Africa, there 
are apparently reliable reports of the use of coitus inter-
ruptus among the Masai and'the Nandi before these tribes 
had extended contact with Europeans.^^ 
Of the methods not employing any appliance, coitus 
interruptus is of course the oldest. Eor example, it was 
known and condemned in Old Testament times in the story of 
Onan. The method of periodic abstinence has been much more 
recently worked out. Both methods are of some effectiveness. 
However, both make heavy demands on a couple and are at best 
of inferior reliability. 
It was with the development of the vulcanizing process 
for rubber that cheap and effective contraceptives — the 
condom and the diaphragm — become widely available. With 
the addition of the chemical spermicides, which also work 
on the principle of interposing a barrier between sperm and 
ovum, the set of "traditional" contraceptives was complete. 
These methods — both non-appliance and appliance — 
provided the basis for the European fall in fertility (with 
an unknown amount of assistance from induced abortion). 
However, they have not proven to be equally acceptable .and 
effective in all societies. In many of the underdeveloped 
and developing societies, unforeseen problems arose in their 
use. Lack of privacy, lack of adequate sanitation facilities, 
personal squeamishness and reticence, limited communication 
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between spouses, inability to conform to an unfamiliar and 
demanding regimen — all these seem to have placed a sharp 
limit on the effectiveness, of these traditional methods. 
Perhaps the basic point was that the methods were not suited 
to the nature and degree of motivation for family planning 
that existed. 
A major innovation in contraception occurred with the 
development of ovulation-inhibiting chemicals that could 
be used by humans. "The pill" was field-tested on humans 
in the mid-1950's and soon after was accepted in most 
countries as a method that could be generally used with 
adequate medical supervision.. This method seems to have 
had a sharp impact on contraceptive practice in some of the 
urban-industrial societies where it-replaced traditional 
methods for a substantial number of contraceptors. However, 
it has not had nearly so great an importance in developing 
countries. A very important liability of the pill is its 
relatively higher costs. An equally important deterrant is 
that its successful use demands a rather special sort of 
discipline — one pill each day for 20 days. Finally, and 
more seriously, there, are medical and physiological problems. 
For some women, the pill has unpleasant side effects which 
lead to discontinuance. Moreover, the pill functions by 
means of introducing endocrine changes that are relatively 
far-reaching. There is unresolved uneasiness about possible 
associations with pathologic conditions. 
Far more important for the developing countries has 
been the more recent introduction and widespread use of the 
intra-uterine contraceptive devices. Knowledge of the 
possibility of contraception by means of an intra-uterine 
device has a very long history. It has been reported that 
for centuries, Arab and Turkish camel herders have prevented 
pregnancy in their animals by means of a small stone Inserted 
into the uturus. The use of uterine pessaries by humans 
seems to have been known and used (although not always for 
contraceptive purposes) since classical times. However, it 
was never widely used. Modern' application began with the 
introduction of the G-rafenberg ring and the Fust intra-
uterine ring with a cervical extension in the 1920's. These 
devices were not commonly accepted at the outset, perhaps 
because they bore a superficial resemblance tc- intra-cervical 
devices which, are considered to be dangerous. About' 1959? 
interest was rekindled by reports of safe and effective 
use of the G-rafenberg ring and a very similar device, the 
Ota ring, by large numbers of women over long periods of time. 
Since 1959, improved models, generally of an inert 
polyethylene, have been introduced and widely tested and used. 
They have proven to be remarkably easy to use, safe, and 
effective. Insertion is very simple and almost painless; 
dilation of the cervix is not required. Once in place, they 
can safely remain for a matter of a year or more. Removal 
for examination or to permit a desired pregnancy is equally 
simple. Their failure rate is below that of comparable 
traditional methods. While some women experience undesire-
able side-effects — inter-menstrual bleeding is common 
during the first month or two — the necessity for removal 
of the device occurs only for some 10$ to 20$ of women. 
Spontaneous expulsion of the device, especially during the 
first few months, has been a problem. • However, between some 
60$ and 85$ of all women, depending on the model of device 
used, experience neither the need for removal nor an expulsion 
and continue to wear the device with complete satisfaction. 
There is no evidence that these devices are carcinogenic or 
otherwise pathogenic. The discussion below of field programs 
will show that use of IUCD's has been extensive and very 
successful. 
Two other methods of limiting fertility, steriliza-
tion and induced abortion, remain to be noted. Both have 
played an important role in some countries. 
Sterilization specifically for contraceptive purposes 
is relatively common in many of the more advanced societies. 
However, it is in India that the method has been most widely 
used. In recent years, over 100,000 contraceptive steriliza-
tions have been performed annually. The total number per-
formed is now reaching one million. 
Sterilizations can now be performed very safely and 
with complete effectiveness. Vasectomy,is a very minor 
operation and is sometimes reversible. Salpingectomy is 
more difficult and is irreversible. In neither operation is 
subsequent sexual activity affected. 
• o • / 
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. Knowledge of how to induce an abortion is very old. 
In the past, it has been a somewhat dangerous operation. 
This was particularly the case since it has been condemned 
in most societies and hence carried out in less than optimum 
surroundings. Recently, and especially in Japan and the 
Socialist world, as a result of ibs much wider acceptance 
and use, the medical technology of abortion has been much 
improved. If carried out early in the pregnancy, risk to 
maternal health is negligible. It can be done very cheaply, 
easily, and quickly. There are reports that the techniques 
of inducing abortions are continuing to be substantially 
improved, particularly through research in the USSR and 
Eastern Europe. 
Field Programs. 
We will now examine the programs in developing areas 
designed to bring the possibilities for family planning to 
the attention of the population. It is worth noting at the 
outset that all of the programs are voluntary. The only 
element of compulsion can be found in the very mild matter 
of raising the legal age of marriage in countries such as 
India and China. The larger goal is unformly limited to 
making the existing technology of family planning available 
to everyone. 
Two of the largest programs, which have been operating 
for some 15 years, are found in India and Pakistan. Until 
quite recently they have experienced very limited success 
indeed. In fact, it seems to be a reasonable supposition 
that a good deal of the pessimism generally associated with 
family planning in the developing countries during recent 
years arises from awareness of the rather poor showing in 
India and Pakistan. Therefore, it is appropriate to begin 
by reviewing their experience. 
In India, family planning has been a component of the 
national policy for development since the inception of the 
first five-year plan in 1951. Despite the early start, 
though, accomplishment has been very slight. Fertility 
levels continue high and substantially unchanged. A large 
number of factors is involved in this lack of success. 
However, an especially large responsibility must be given 
to the very limited budgets available for family planning 
- I n -
activities. During the first five-year plan, expenditures 
for family planning came to shs. .0014 per capita per year. 
(All amounts in this report will be given in East African 
shillings.) Eor the second five-year plan, 1956-1960, the 
amount rose to just less than shs. .02 per capita annually. 
In the quinquennium just completed, preliminary figures 
indicate that expenditures will have risen to almost ten 
times the preceding amount. 
These very small amounts were insufficient to produce 
any measurable impact on India's fertility. The success of 
the sterilization program is, of course, impressive — but 
so is the 20-odd million births now occurring annually in 
the country. In general, the expenditures were useful in 
permitting the development of a national network of family 
planning clinics and providing valuable information that is 
being used in current efforts. The most important lesson 
that has been learned is that in a country like India, with 
immense problems of education, staffing, and simple logistics, 
an effective family planning program cannot be had for little 
of no investment. The current amount budgeted for the fourth 
five-year plan (1966-1970) comes to shs. .58 per capita 
annually. 
Emphasis' has now "been given to the IUCD. Nearly a 
third of a million devices had been inserted by the end of 
1965, the first year of their use. 100,000 of these were 
in the- one state of Bengal. Acceptability by the public 
is clearly very high. The target for 1966 is one million 
IUCD's inserted. Sterilization and traditional contraceptives 
will also be continued in India's current serious efforts 
to control her rate of population growth. 
The history of Pakistan's efforts to bring family 
planning to her people closely parallels that of India. 
Efforts have continued over a fifteen-year period and again 
there have been no visible success in reducing fertility. 
Expenditures averaged about shs. .07 per capita per year. 
A new, much more intensive, approach was begun in 
mid-1965. Expenditures are now budgeted to run to some 
shs. .84 per capita annually over a five year period — one 
of the highest allotments for family planning in the world. 
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(It is vvorth. noting uhat even during the recent conflict 
with India, when most government budgets were sharply altered, 
there was no cut in the family planning allocation.) As 
in India, emphasis is no?/ being given to use of the IUCD. 
Impressive accomplishments in family planning programs 
have already been made in the Par East, especially in areas 
associated with Chinese culture. The goals of the govern-
ment of.China itself of lowering fertility have already 
been noted. Unfortunately, there is little detailed inform-
ation concerning the procedures by which the goals are to 
be implemented. Rather more information is available about 
programs in surrounding countries. 
The Republic of Korea, faced with a growth rate of 
about 3 per cent per year, began an extensive national 
family planning program in 1964= After some difficulties 
of finance and logistics during the first months, the. 
program began to function and v/as in full operation by the 
end of 1964. Accomplishments of the first year included 
30,000 vasectomies, 250,000 regular users of traditional 
contraceptives (condom, diaphragm, chemical spermicides), 
and 90,000 IUCD's inserted. In 1965 there was a sharp and 
rapid switch in favor of IUCD's by the clients of the program. 
By the end of the j^ ear, over 200,000 had been inserted. 
The program in Korea has active government support. 
It is adequately financed with a budget running currently 
at about shs. .48 per capita. Although Korea's vital 
statistics are insufficiently precise to measure the impact 
of the family planning program, such an effect undoubtedly 
exists. 
Another successful operation is found in Taiwan. 
Impetus was- developed in part from a pilot project in the 
city of Taichung, where an experimental program showed a 17 
per cent decline in the birth rate in one year. A national 
effort was mounted in 1964, although with limited official 
support. (For example, the naticr.al mass media did not 
become available.to the family pl.anning program until recent 
months.) In any event, the prrgram moved ahead. In the 
first year, 1964; 46,000 IUCD's were inserted. The number 
rose to about 100,000 in 196r>. There was supporting use of 
traditional contraceptives, -is well. It is still too early 
• « o / 
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to evaluate the impact of the program in detail. However, 
the birthrate of Taiwan is noticeably declining. 
Acceptance of family planning is evident in other 
areas of predominantly Chinese culture, as well. In Hong 
Kong, with an active privately operated family planning 
association, birth rates are falling. Some 40,000 IUCD's 
have already been inserted through the auspices of the 
association. Comparable conditions obtain in Singapore, 
Malaysia, and Thailand. 
In Ceylon, a pilot family planning project in one 
village showed a decline in the birth rate of some 30 per 
cent over a 4 year experiment. (However, another pilot 
project on a tea estate showed virtually no change in 
fertility whatever over the same period.) At this point, 
there is no indication of a national program in Ceylon. 
Turning now to the Arab world, somewhat less progress 
toward family planning is found. However, a few important 
programs are beginning to come into operation. The first 
national project in the field is in Tunisia. Starting near 
the end of 1-964, this effort is now well underway. Some 
12,000 IUCD's have been inserted and expectations are that 
the program will gain momentum with time. Activities in 
this Tunisian case are being shared between government and 
the nation's political part, the Destourian Socialists. 
The latter handles public information and education. 
In the United Arab Republic, it is expected that 
a major field operation will soon be developed. President 
Nasser has reiterated the need for such a program and the 
government is preparing for action. A supreme council 
of family planning has been established with President Nasser 
as its head and with a budget of about shs.20,000,000. 
There are firm plans to begin the manufacture of IUCD's 
in the United Arab Republic. 
Morocco and Algeria have also shown interest in 
developing family planning programs. A high level fission 
from the former country has recently investigated the 
Tunisian operation with a view to its adaptation in Morocco., 
Apart from the Arab world in the Middle East, Turkey 
has also recently developed a mai^r program. Although until 
a very short time age there were laws restrictint ijag the 
• o o / 
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importation and distribution of contraceptives, the nation 
is now moving quickly and effectively to facilitate family 
planning. Since the new legislation has been in effect for 
less than a year, field operations have not had time to mature. 
However, the intensity of activity by all agencies of the 
government — even the army is to be involved — suggests 
that one may well expect a high level of effectiveness. 
In Africa south of the Sahara, there are as yet no 
national family planning programs. In several countries, 
private clinics are beginning to develop on a fairly 
extensive scale, however. For example, there are now more 
than twenty such clinics in Kenya. In addition to provid-
ing information and supplies for use of traditional con-
traceptives, it is estimated that several thousand IUCD's 
have already been inserted in this one country. Moreover, 
there are indications that several countries are approaching 
the point of direct national involvement in family planning 
programs. Indications, from Nigeria are that the new regime 
is even more concerned than the previous government. 
In general, then, a world survey indicates that national 
programs of family planning are becoming more and more wide-
spread. More money is being invested in this area. Most 
importantly, the programs are beginning to meet their goals. 
Cost. 
The preceding descriptions of national programs have 
contained some brief comments on costs. Heedless to say, 
these figures are very rough and must be used with caution 
except when pointing to gross differences. In specific 
field situations, for example, there will he varying amounts 
of cost absorbed by existing facilities which can be adapted 
or used. It would be a surprising situation if a nation had 
to mount a program covering all costs from anew. Generally, 
existing health facilities can be drawn upon. However, it 
appears to be a useful rule of thumb to exje-ct a viable 
family planning program to run in the vicirity of shs. .35 
to shs. .50 per capita annually. An encouraging marginal 
note is that the costs do not necessarily g3 on forever. 
Japan has recently decided to terminate all remaining 
government assistance to family planning hn:c birthrate having 
been brought well into reasonable levels by means of a 
national program of contraception and abortion. 
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Costs per capita are a most useful method of evaluating 
amounts of money spent in family planning. However, it is 
also illuminating to see these expenditures measured in 
another way. Based largely on the experience of Taiwan, 
it is estimated that it costs between shs. 35/00 and shs.85/00 
to help a woman avoid an unwanted pregnancy. The significance 
of these figures become clear when they are compared with 
the costs of taking a child — even at the barest minimum 
levels of health, nutrition, clothing, and education — to 
his entry into the productive labor force. 
To conclude, there is evidence of a major shift in 
perspective on population matters underway around the world. 
First, numbers of people as such have lost much of their 
importance. Second, high fertility is no longer seen as 
a guarantee of future social well-being. Third, attention 
is being focussed more and more on the rate of population 
growth and on the underlying age structure. Finally, 
population dynamics are coming more and more to be seen 
as variables amenable to intelligent planning. Indeed, 
from a growing number of policy perspectives, there is 
virtually an obligation to engage in population planning. 
Family planning programs are increasing in coverage and in 
intensity. And they are beginning to show success. 
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